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Abstract 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) of all shapes and scales are enjoying increasing popularity. An UAS’ 
purpose and scale can reach from very small toys up to large systems the size of common civil aircraft and 
able to transport several tons of payload or even passengers. In recent years, the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) began to develop a regulatory framework for all kinds of UAS. In traditional civil aircraft, 
critical failures pose a high risk for humans such as pilots, cabin crew or passengers. For UAS, the potential 
risk of fatalities and damage to critical infrastructure depends on the actual operation in combination with the 
operational environment. Therefore, the focus of the regulation can be changed from an aircraft centric risk 
assessment towards an operation centric risk assessment. Throughout this paper, an overview of the latest 
regulatory developments in the UAS category is given. Furthermore, the paper describes and discusses the 
similarities and differences between a common civil aviation qualitative risk assessment and the new Specific 






In recent years the use of UAS for private and 
commercial operations has increased dramatically. 
The EASA was the competent authority for UAS with 
a take-off weight of more than 150 kg from the very 
beginning. In contrast, for UAS with lower take-off 
weight, the competent authorities of each of the 
EASA member states were responsible to regulate 
operational approvals. This led to flight permissions 
and regulations that differ from member state to 
member state. In an attempt to standardise UAS 
operation approvals even below 150 kg take-off 
weight, the EASA created three categories of UAS 
operation with increasing level of rigour [1]. The 
Open category comprehends low risk operations 
that need almost no regulation such as flying toy 
drones. The second category is called Specific 
category and covers a wide range of intermediate 
risk operations with small and lightweight toy drones 
up to UAS with a considerable amount of wingspan 
and weight. The third and last category is the 
Certified category for UAS operations that pose risks 
to humans comparable to that of traditional manned 
aviation. Following that approach, the Joint 
Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems 
(JARUS) developed a new methodology to assess 
the risk of an UAS operation in the Specific 
category. The Specific Operations Risk Assessment 
(SORA) is a qualitative approach and takes various 
factors into account to recommend a set of 
requirements for the UAS and the operation. These 
requirements depend on the aircraft system itself, 
the area of operation in air and over ground, and 
strategies to mitigate possible harm to others. 
However, the known recommended practices in civil 
aviation offer several different risk assessment 
approaches. Therefore the necessity of a whole new 
approach is questionable. This paper describes a 
comparison of the SORA and an established 
qualitative risk assessment in civil aviation. 
Within this paper the authors give an overview of the 
current regulatory basics in civil aviation as well as 
the recent developments of the European UAS 
regulations. Furthermore, a qualitative operation 
oriented risk assessment approach commonly used 
in civil manned aviation is chosen and compared to 
the risk assessment method of the SORA process. 
The Paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is an 
introduction to the latest regulatory framework for 
manned civil aviation as well as some of the most 
common risk assessment processes. Section 3 
deals with the current European UAS regulation and 
gives an overview about the SORA. Related work is 
presented in section 4 and put into perspective of 
the UAS regulation and the research topic of this 
paper. In section 5, the comparison between the 
established qualitative risk assessment in manned 
aviation and the SORA approach is developed. The 
paper closes with a conclusion and further research 
topics on SORA in section 6. 
 
2. MANNED CIVIL AVIATION 
2.1. Regulatory Framework 
The processes of risk- and safety assessment of 
common civil aviation is strongly influenced by the 
regulations and rules established by national and 
international authorities. In order to comprehend the 
origin of the risk and safety methodology, it is 
necessary to give a short overview of the regulatory 
framework of the EASA. This framework evolved 
over the years to the current point. The paper 
describes the framework in its latest version. In 
2002, the European Parliament introduced the 
Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 as Basic Regulation 
to establish the EASA as regulatory organization as 
well as common rules of civil aviation [2]. On July 4
th
, 
2018, the EASA introduced the latest version of the 
basic regulation, the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 [3]. 
In 2012, the European Commission released the 
latest version of their Commission Regulation on 
rules to attain an initial airworthiness and 
environmental certification of aircraft including 
products and parts as well as the certification of 
design and production organizations [4]. There are 
several other Commission Regulations in place to 
deal with other aspects of aircraft airworthiness such 
as Continuing Airworthiness, Air Operations or Air 
Crew. This paper, however, focuses on the risk 
assessment that is necessary to gain an initial 
airworthiness certification. An important part of the 
Commission Regulation on initial airworthiness for 
certification of aircraft is the Annex I, Part-21. 
 
 
Figure 1: Breakdown of the regulatory framework of 
manned civil aviation from Basic Regulation to CS-25 
 
Annex Part-21 is divided into Section A – Technical 
Requirements and Section B – Procedures for 
Competent Authorities. Section A is organized into 
several subparts whereas Subpart B describes the 
actions to gain a Type Certification (TC) or a 
restricted TC for the aircraft. A valid TC or restricted 
TC is necessary to operate the aircraft in civil 
airspace [4]. To obtain a TC, the manufacturer has, 
amongst other things, to comply with the applicable 
Certification Specification for the aircraft type. There 
are several Certification Specifications available 
such as the CS-25 for large airplanes and the CS-23 
for Normal-Category airplanes [5] [6]. A breakdown 
of the regulatory framework is shown in Figure 1. 
Taking the CS-25 as an example, an important part 
from the risk and safety point of view is paragraph 
CS 25.1309 “Equipment, Systems and Installations”. 
It deals with design and installation requirements of 
systems and equipment for large airplanes. In 
particular, the paragraph deals with the severity and 
occurrence of system and component failures. It 
also refers to the acceptable means of compliance 
AMC 25.1309 of CS 25 Book 2 Subpart F. The 
purpose of the AMC 25.1309 is to describe 
acceptable means to demonstrate compliance with 
the requirements of paragraph CS 25.1309. 
2.2. Risk Assessment 
Risk Assessment is a major part of the overall safety 
assessment process performed throughout the 
complete airplane life cycle. There are several 
acceptable means of compliance in civil aviation that 
deal with safety. Among these are the SAE ARP 
4754A [7], ARP 4761 [8], ARP 5150 [9] and ARP 
5151 [10], as well as the DO-178C [11], DO-254 [12] 
and DO-297 [13] (Figure 2). ARP 4754A is a widely 
spread recommended practice that introduces and 
describes a whole civil aircraft and systems 
development process. ARP 4761, on the other hand, 
introduces and explains the safety assessment 
process that needs to be performed throughout the 
development process. It further describes the use of 
safety assessment guidelines and methods used 
during the process. ARP 5150 and ARP 5151 
describe methods and tools to assess risk, mainly 
throughout the operational phase (Figure 2). 
Especially ARP 5150: “Safety Assessment of 
Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service” will be 
discussed in more detail within this document. 
Because of its focus on risk assessment with regard 
to transport airplanes already in operation, ARP 
5150 seems appropriate for comparison with the 
SORA developed for UAS operation. It is assumed 
that in most cases the operational risk assessment 
would have to consider already existing UAS. Those 
UAS would have to be applied to as much different 
operational scenarios as possible. Therefore ARP 
5150 is chosen over the ARP 4754A and ARP 4761, 





Figure 2: Connection of the SAE ARP and RTCA DO 
standards according to [7] 
2.3. ARP 5150 Risk Assessment Root Cause 
Analysis 
The aerospace recommended practice ARP 5150 
describes a structured, continuing safety process for 
the operating fleet and as well as several tools and 
methods to conduct the assessment of risks. The 
ARP 5150 describes the following methods [9]: 
 Root Cause (Event Tree) Analysis 
 Weibull Analysis 
 Monte Carlo Simulation Analysis 
 Corrective Action Scheduling 
 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Reliability Growth Modelling 
 Human Factors Methods & Tools 
 Fleet Risk Exposure Analysis 
It is beyond the scope of this document to explain 
and discuss the whole process and all of the 
presented methods. However, the Root Cause 
(Event Tree) Analysis will be explored in detail, 
because it is a qualitative approach to assess risk 
and seems to share some similarities with the 
SORA, which is discussed later in the document. 
The Root Cause or Event Tree Analysis in context of 
ARP 5150 is a risk assessment approach which is 
relatively simple to use. It has a clear structure and 
allows for comprehensive documentation of the 
assessment process [9]. The standard Root Cause 
Analysis consists of three main tools, the event tree, 
the root cause disposition chart and the action item 
list. 
The event tree is roughly comparable with a fault 
tree. Instead of a main failure, there is the main 
undesired event that is going to be examined on the 
top of the tree. Just like the fault tree, the event tree 
evolves with other plausible minor events that 
contribute to the main event. In contrast to the 
common fault tree, however, no logical gates are 
used, but instead the causes are regarded as 
independent from each other. As causes and 
contributing minor causes evolve, the event tree 
becomes a more or less root like structure. If the top 
level undesired event is narrowed down to one or 
more causes that cannot be broken down further, 
the root cause of the top level event is found. In fact, 
one main event may have more than one root 
cause, as shown in Figure 3. The less specific the 
top event is, the more root causes it probably has. 
 
 
Figure 3: Generic Event Tree 
When the event tree analysis is conducted in a 
satisfying manner, the next step is to create a root 
cause disposition chart. This chart is used to track 
all known data of each cause, including supporting 
and refuting evidence for its contribution to the top 
level event as well as action items for each cause. 
Action items are normally assigned to events and 
causes to gather more information about the 
contribution of the cause to the top level event [9]. 
The action items themselves are explained and 
tracked in the action item list. With the use of the 
gathered information, it has to be determined if the 
root cause is a probable contributor to the top level 
event or if the found cause is unlikely to be a 
contributor and therefore can be closed. At the end 
of the process, a well-documented set of key 
contributors to the top level event will remain that 
have to be addressed by mitigation actions. An 
additional advantage of the event tree is the option 
to convert the tree into a fault tree. This can be done 
by adding gates like the commonly known “And/Or”-
Gates. 
It is important to understand that the event tree 
application and risk assessment in general is an 
iterative process that needs several iterations by the 
assessment team to be complete.  
 
3. UNMANNED CIVIL AVIATION 
3.1. Regulatory Framework 
Since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the use of 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) constantly 
increased. To cope with the rising number of UAS in 
civil applications, the EASA released a policy 
statement regarding the airworthiness certification of 
UAS in 2009. The content of the policy statement is 
based on certification requirements derived from 
Annex Part-21 of the Commission Regulation [14]. In 
2015, the EASA introduced three new UAS 
categories included in a new regulatory framework 
[15]. The categories Open, Specific and Certified 
were established to facilitate low and medium risk 
UAS operations, where a whole certification process 
according to Part-21 would be inappropriate. 
The Open category covers low risk operations. This 
category requires only a few operational rules, such 
as “stay away from people”, as well as product 
safety requirements and mass limitations. 
The Specific category covers medium risk 
operations, for which an authorization from a 
national aviation authority is required 
The Certified category covers operations with higher 
risks that are comparable to risks in manned 
aviation. Hence, the requirements to obtain an 
authorization under the Certified category are quite 
similar to those of manned aviation [15]. In 2016, 
EASA released the draft of a new annex of the 
Commission Regulation for unmanned aviation. The 
new annex is named Part-UAS and covers the 
regulation of the Open and the Specific category [1]. 
In the Specific category, a risk assessment has to be 
carried out in order to attain operation permission by 
the competent authority. The risk assessment 
considers the risk not only of the operation, but the 
operator competences and UAS performance and 
characteristics as well. One acceptable means of 
compliance to perform such a risk assessment is the 
use of the SORA methodology proposed by JARUS 
[16]. 
3.2. SORA Methodology 
The SORA is a holistic risk assessment 
methodology currently under development by 
JARUS [16]. 
The SORA methodology is an iterative process to 
assess the risk of the intended operation with regard 
to the UAS used as well as the operator capabilities. 
The input to the SORA process is a concept of 
operations document (ConOps) which contains the 
description of the intended operation, technical data 
of the UAS and information on the operator. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified SORA process 
The SORA process uses the information about the 
operation and the characteristics of the UAS to 
assess the so called ground risk and air risk. The 
ground risk is the estimated qualitative risk for 
people and infrastructure on ground to be hit by the 
UA. It is composed of different categories that take 
the characteristic dimension, the expected kinetic 
energy and the overflown area into account. The 
characteristic dimension is usually represented by 
the wingspan or the rotor diameter of the UA. It is 
divided into four UAS classes. These classes are for 
UAS with 1 m, 3 m, 8 m and over 8 m of 
characteristic dimension. The air risk describes the 
qualitative risk to have a mid-air collision with 
manned aircraft. The air risk is based on the typical 
expected airspace density of a certain airspace 
class. For example, the airspace density in airspace 
class C is expected to be much higher than in 
airspace class G over rural environment. Both, 
ground and air risk are combined in a Specific 
Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL). The SAIL 
classification is tied to a set of requirements that 
have to be met in order to gain an approval for the 
intended operation by a competent authority. The 
SAIL classification reaches from SAIL I to SAIL VI 
with increasing levels of rigour (Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Increasing levels of rigour in the Specific 
category 
The set of requirements targets the main threats of 
UAS operation identified by JARUS [17]. These 
threats are: 
 Technical issue with the UAS 
 Human error 
 Aircraft on collision course 
 Adverse operation conditions 
 Deterioration of external systems supporting 
the UAS operation 
Each of these threats that could possibly lead to an 
operation out of control event is addressed by 
several Operational Safety Objectives (OSO). OSO 
are meant to lower the possibility of the assigned 
threat to evolve into an operation out of control 
event. These OSO are also referred to as threat 
barriers in versions prior to the draft version V2.0 of 
the SORA methodology. Depending on the assigned 
SAIL, each threat barrier has one of three levels of 
robustness. The robustness can either be low, 












Low Low Low 
Medium 
Integrity 
Low Medium Medium 
High 
Integrity 
Low Medium High 
Table 1: Threat barrier robustness determination matrix 
The SORA defines integrity “as the safety gain 
provided by each mitigation [or threat barrier]” [16]. 
Assurance is defined “as the proof that the claimed 
safety gain has been achieved” [16]. In general, a 
low assurance is a declaration of the operator that 
the requirements are met. For a medium assurance, 
the operator provides supporting evidence that the 
requirements are met. That can be done though 
means of testing, simulation or proof of experience. 
The high level assurance includes an acceptance of 
the supporting evidence by a competent third party. 
To lower the SAIL to be reached, the operator has 
the opportunity to use defined mitigations to lower 
the risk of the operation below the intrinsic risk. The 
intrinsic risk within SORA is the ground or air risk 
without any mitigation applied. The mitigations to 
reduce the intrinsic ground risk were referred to as 
harm barriers in releases of the SORA documents 
prior to draft version V2.0. These barriers are meant 
to reduce the possible harm to third parties on the 
ground or in the air if the UAS operation went out of 
control. The possible mitigations are: 
 Emergency Response Plan (ERP) in place, 
operator validated and effective 
 Effects of ground impact are reduced  
 Technical containment in place and effective 
In case the operation went out of control, the ERP 
should cover measures to be taken to limit crash 
escalating effects. Those effects could be fire or 
injured people resulting from the crash. “Effects of 
ground impact are reduced” means a reduction of 
impact dynamics such as the size of the crash area 
or impact energy. Technical containment is meant to 
reduce the number of people at risk. This includes 
the concept of a safety buffer and a strategy to 
recover from emergencies, for example with the help 
of a termination or monitoring system [18]. 
The mitigations can have a low, medium or high 
robustness as shown in Table 1, depending on how 
much they reduce the ground risk. 
The air risk can be reduced by strategic mitigations. 
These mitigations usually take the form of a 
separation of the UAS from manned aircraft.  
Among other options, separation can be achieved 
through: 
 The restriction of operation of the UAS in a 
part of the airspace with low density of air 
traffic 
 Operational restriction to a certain time of 
the day 
 Operational restriction by the time of 
exposure  
With the help of the mitigation strategies, the 
operator can reduce the assigned SAIL without 
reducing the safety of third parties, according to the 
SORA methodology. 
 
4. RELATED WORK 
Throughout this paper, a comparison between the 
Specific categories operation centric risk 
assessment and one specific qualitative method of 
the risk assessment in manned civil aviation is 
given. Since the SORA process, especially the 
details, are relatively new, not much research work 
regarding SORA was found. However, this section 
offers a small overview of research done in the very 
recent years that the authors consider to be 
comparable to SORA. 
In 2014, Clothier and Walker published a chapter 
titled “The Safety Risk Management of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems” [19]. They discuss a general safety 
and risk management approach for UAS following 
the so called ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) idea. They introduced a risk 
management process including various common risk 
assessment approaches. Those are embedded in 
communication and consultation, risk treatment and 
monitor and review actions. Clothier and Walker set 
their focus for hazards on mid-air collision with other 
participants and collision with third parties on ground 
or infrastructure as primary hazards. In contrast to 
SORA, they also introduced secondary hazards in 
form of debris falling to the ground. Throughout their 
publication, they discussed general options to 
analyse and evaluate risk introducing the ALARP 
framework. Regarding risk treatment, mitigation 
options are discussed for mid-air and ground 
collisions that are relatively similar to the mitigation 
strategies SORA offers or requires. One example 
would be See & Avoid options or the use of 
geofence. Since this chapter was meant to briefly 
discuss the introduced safety risk management 
process of UAS, it might be worthwhile to perform a 
detailed comparison to the SORA methodology in 
the future. 
In 2016, Guglieri and Ristorto published a paper 
dealing with RPAS (remotely piloted aircraft 
systems) with a take-off mass of 25 kg or less and 
proposed a safety assessment regarding the 
requirements established by the Italian aviation 
authority ENAC (Entre Nazionale per l’Aviazione 
Civile). At that time, the authorization and regulation 
of UAS with a take-off mass of less or equal than 
150 kg was under responsibility of the national 
aviation authority of each EASA member state [20]. 
In their methodology, they focused on ground impact 
and discussed a risk analysis for light RPAS 
considering effects like population density, shelter 
and failure probability. Despite being outdated by the 
EASA’s announcement to establish a common 
regulatory framework for any UAS type throughout 
the EASA member states, the intended methodology 
shows some similarities with the current SORA 
versions V1.0 and the draft V2.0. Guglieri and 
Ristorto discuss the need for safety as well as the 
possibility of shelter in case of small UAS. 
Neglecting the air risk component of the SORA 
methodology, the discussed use case seems to 
apply for the 1 m and 3 m class mentioned in section 
3.2 with SAIL I or SAIL II scoring regarding the 
operation. The quantitative approach to the risk 
assessment intended by Guglieri and Ristorto might 
be an interesting comparison to mathematical model 
of the SORA. Even though the SORA is a qualitative 
approach there is a mathematical model behind the 
risk classification that is not yet published. 
In 2018, a paper was published by la Cour-Harbo 
comparing the stepwise iterative SORA process to a 
high fidelity risk modelling (HFRM) [21]. He used a 
set of two different, relatively small UAS and eight 
different flight scenarios to compare the results of 
the SORA methodology with the HFRM. As common 
basis, he used the fatality rate. La Cour-Harbo 
concludes that despite their differences, the SORA 
and the HFRM approach are largely in agreement. 
However, backup assumptions needed to be applied 
due to the lack of exact knowledge and data. 
 
5. RISK ASSESSMENT COMPARISON 
The common basis for the comparison done 
throughout this paper is the qualitative assessment 
approach instead of the fatality rate used in the work 
by la Cour-Harbo. The main idea of SORA is to 
establish an easy to use qualitative risk assessment. 
Therefore, from all of the methods shown in ARP 
5150, the one with the most qualitative approach 
was chosen as described in section 2.3. 
It is necessary to have a common understanding of 
the underlying assessment mechanism to be able to 
compare both risk assessment approaches. 
The Root Cause Analysis starts with a top level 
undesired event such as a high level failure event. 
However, the applicant is more or less free to 
choose on which level of detail the event tree should 
start. A detailed or specific top level event, such as 
rudder actuator failure, seems to be adequate to find 
root causes to that event in a short amount of time. 
A more general top level event, for example loss of 
the aircraft, evolves in a more spread-out event tree. 
In civil manned aviation, the undesired top level 
event, among some others, might be death to 
people or loss of the aircraft since those two events 
are highly linked in manned aviation. A further 
development of the causes of loss of the aircraft 




Figure 6: High level event tree for manned aviation 
Technical Issues include all kind of causes with 
technical failure background. Some of those are the 
failure of system components, fatigue of materials 
used, manufacturing issues or maintenance issues. 
Human Error is related directly to errors done by the 
crew including the pilot or to errors done by the 
maintenance personnel. Adverse Operating 
Conditions refer to all possible causes related to the 
operation, such e.g. as severe weather conditions. 
The SORA risk model shown in [17] has a very 
similar approach.  
 
 
Figure 7: High level event tree according to SORA 
The threat “Aircraft on Collision Course” included in 
[17] seems to be more detailed than the other 
threats. Therefore, the authors suggest the usage of 
the term air traffic instead, because it includes the 
threat of aircraft on collision course within a more 
general context. 
Compared to the general event tree performed with 
ARP 5150, there are some noticeable differences in 
SORA. The unwanted top level event known from 
the event tree in Figure 6 is now divided into three 
parts. The diversion into third parties on ground and 
in air is plausible regarding the mechanism of 
mitigation strategies implemented in SORA, since 
some mitigation only apply to third parties on ground 
or only to third parties in air. The added damage to 
critical infrastructure now becomes a considerable 
unwanted top level event because not every UAS 
crash will eventually lead to injuries to third parties. 
The central cause changed in SORA from loss of 
control of the aircraft to a more general “operation 
out of control”. It is plausible to take a wider 
approach that considers the whole operation, since 
the sole loss of UAS control does not automatically 
lead to harm of third parties. Also included in the 
SORA based event tree is the idea of a higher 
dependability on datalink connection and external 
services, lacking a pilot or any other kind of operator 
on board. 
The next step according to ARP 5150 is to further 
develop each root of the tree. Figure 8 shows the 
further development of the technical issues root. In 
an action item list that is updated with each root 
level, it can be determined if the root is a probable 
contributor to the main cause. It can also be 
determined if it is worthwhile to further develop the 




Figure 8: Technical Issues root developing 
A fully developed event tree can now be the basis 
for further actions such as mitigation actions for 
each uncovered root cause. However, the 
appropriate rigour of the different mitigation 
strategies has to be assessed by the applicant. 
Basically, the SORA process offers one further 
developed root cause level, which has several root 
causes identified for each root shown in Figure 7. 
The roots for the technical issues cause are in short 
[16]: 
 Operator competency 
 UAS manufacturing competency 
 UAS maintenance competency 
 Inappropriate or no standards during UAS 
development 
 Inappropriate C3 link performance 
 UAS safety and reliability not considered 
during design phase 
 Inspection of the UAS regarding the 
ConOps 
 Lack of defined, validated and adhered 
operational procedures 
 Inappropriate crew training 
 Lack of recovery ability from technical issue 
 
For each of these roots, SORA also has 
requirements to be fulfilled that can be viewed as 
mitigation actions regarding the root cause. In 
difference to the follow up of the Root Cause 
Analysis as described in ARP 5150, the applicant 
does not have to further determine appropriate 
mitigations as the connection between mitigation 
action because the level of rigour and the assessed 
ground and air risk is done within the SORA process 
(see Table 1). The cause “UAS maintenance 
competency” shall be mentioned as an example.  
The integrity and assurance requirements for low 
and medium robustness are as followed: 
Low: 
 The UAS maintenance procedures are 
defined and cover at least the UAS designer 
instructions and requirements 
 The maintenance team is defined 
 The maintenance procedures are 
documented 
 The maintenance conducted on the UAS are 
documented in a maintenance log 
 The training of the maintenance team to 
maintain the UAS is self-declared with 
evidence available 
In an inverse formulation, those five requirements 
would resemble the root causes of the maintenance 
competency root. For this specific example, the 
event tree may take the form of Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Root causes of Maintenance Issues 
It can be seen that even with the low level 
requirements, potential causes for a lack of 
maintenance competencies are addressed. 
 
Medium, in addition to low: 
 The maintenance procedures take the form 
of a maintenance program 
 Maintenance team is competent 
 The maintenance procedures are validated 
against a recognized standard 
 Maintenance syllabus includes the UAS 
designer instructions and requirements for 
maintenance 
 The maintenance team has undergone initial 
training by the operator 
The medium level requirements do not introduce any 
new root causes but further expand the mitigation 
actions. The high robustness requirements do 
expand the medium level requirements. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The root cause analysis of the ARP 5150 and the 
threat / operational safety objective methodology of 
the SORA process have much in common. The 
basic idea of an event tree with an undesired event 
at the top was shown to exist in the SORA too, even 
if it is not explicitly stated in the draft version V2.0 of 
the SORA process. The differences in the undesired 
top level event can be easily explained by the point 
of view from manned aviation to civil aviation 
including UAS operations. Manned aviation can be 
understood as a special case of the civil aviation, 
where the aircraft is the centre of interest because of 
its passengers. In all other cases, the whole 
operation is in the focus. This is shown on the right 
and middle parts of the event trees of Figure 6 and 
Figure 7. 
Another major difference shows up when the root 
cause analysis and the risk assessment part of the 
SORA process are applied. The SORA process 
gives the applicant an already relatively far 
developed “event tree” including a set of mitigation 
actions as well as a pre-defined level of rigour 
depending on the general risk estimation that has to 
be performed before in the process. The Root 
Cause Analysis as described in ARP 5150 offers a 
structured solution if performed carefully. It also 
offers a fully retraceable documentation of decisions 
made and focus points set throughout the risk 
assessment process. However, performing the root 
cause analysis on a top level seems to be time 
consuming. The risk assessment group has to meet 
and discuss on several iterations to gather more 
information to further develop the tree or to close 
roots. It is up to the applicant to decide if the 
increased effort is worth the benefit of a well-
structured documentation and the possibility to have 
a baseline for failure tree generation. The applicant 
has also to keep in mind that he may need other 
tools to develop the appropriate level of rigour for 
mitigation actions necessary regarding the EASA 
regulations. 
During the comparison, three main questions arose 
that need further research.  
The first is; does the SORA already address all 
important root causes regarding injuries to third 
parties or damage to infrastructure? That question 
should be further targeted within a use case where 
an additional complete root cause analysis is 
performed. This should also include considerations 
on how to find appropriate mitigation actions 
depending on the actual level of risk.  
The second question that arises is linked to the first 
one. Where does the pre-set level of rigour come 
from? Are the required mitigations appropriate?  
The third question should target the fact that the 
SORA explicitly sets injuries of third parties as 
undesired top level event. There are plenty of use 
cases where the risk of injuries to crew members is 
as high as or higher than third parties. For every 
operation in visual line of sight, it can be assumed 
that at least parts of the crew are relatively near to 
the UAS, therefore having a higher risk of being 
struck than third parties. It needs to be analysed if 
the SORA already considers the remote crew safety 
in an appropriate way or if an additional root cause 
analysis has to be performed to assess and mitigate 
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